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Abstract
Many policy makers seem to prefer domestic alternatives to cross-broder mergers.
Can such sentiments make sense? We contruct a model where cross-border mergers
drive down union-set wages, where domestic mergers have larger non-labour cost syn-
ergies than international ones, and where policy evaluators care more about workers
than capital owners. Apparently, the stage is set for national champion policies to be
sensible. However, we also introduce the possibility of capital ￿ ight in the sense that
a domestic ￿rm can physically move its production out of the country. Restrictive
cross-border merger policies can then seriously back￿re, since they do not necessarily
bring about a domestic merger ￿but capital ￿ ight instead.
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11 Introduction
As ￿rms grow larger and larger, mergers tend increasingly to be international.1 At the
same time, many observers pose the question if a foreign takeover will lead to changes
in decision making in the ￿rm in a way that may hurt domestic stakeholders. If an in-
dustry needs restructuring and larger units, would it not be better with national merger
alternatives that can help create ￿ national champions￿that in turn can play a role on the
world arena? Controversial recent proposed cross-border mergers include the attempt by
Italian Enel to take over the French electricity and gas ￿rm Suez (where French authorities
favoured a merger between Suez and Gas de France), the proposed takeover of Spanish
Endesa by German E.on (where what the European commission called ￿ economic patri-
otism￿from Spanish authorities in the end lead E.on to withdraw its bid), and the case
of Dubai Ports, that sought to take over six major ports on the east coast of the US.
Moreover, in the summer of 2007, Norwegian authorities bought a large share of the oil
service ￿rm Aker Kvaerner, in order to prevent the majority owner from selling his shares
to unspeci￿ed foreigners.2 It is sometimes hard to pinpoint exactly what the opponents
of ownership globalisation fear. Some seem to fear that international ￿rms will be slightly
too pro￿t oriented ￿so that good jobs and headquarter services will disappear from the
national economy ￿even when the domestic cost disadvantage possibly is quite small.3
Others seem to worry about foreign owners perhaps being too little pro￿t oriented. Vast
amounts of money accumulate in oil-rich countries and in new industrial giants as China,
and the trend is that this money increasingly is placed in sovereign wealth funds. Espe-
cially in the US many seem to worry that the commando heights of the economy might be
taken over by foreign parties that possibly have strategic interests that do not necessarily
1See UNCTAD (2005) for documentation on the multinational nature of production and investment.
2When Aker Kvaerner was formed through a big merger some years earlier, this alternative appeared
to be much preferred in Norway to the other alternative, namely a takeover of Kvaerner by Russian Yukos.
3Mugele and Schnitzer (2008) explore a theoretical model of the relationship between ownership struc-
ture and location decision. Cultural proximity may lead an owner to locate activities at a location where
he or she understands the culture better, so who is the low-cost provider of a service may be dependent
on the nationality of the owner.
2coincide with those of the host country.4
This paper is an attempt to understand such merger patriotism sentiments, and to
discuss if national champion policies in some circumstances can be warranted. More
speci￿cally we want to develop a story where cross-border mergers have the potential to
harm the interests of domestic workers. The model assumptions are not necessarily chosen
for their empirical relevance, but rather to give the national champion argument a fair
chance. We consequently open up the possibility that cross-border mergers are driven by
the wish to keep down wages for workers in the domestic country. At the same time, we
assume that merger synergies are largest in connection with a domestic merger (not with
the cross-border alternative). Finally, we assume that policy makers put a higher weight
on reductions in domestic wage levels than on possible increases in pro￿ts accruing to
domestic citizens. All this would seem to suggest that a national champion policy could
be the welfare optimal outcome. And this turns out to be correct if a domestic ￿rm only
has the choice between merging domestically or internationally. However, we then open up
a third possibility. We ￿x attention on one particular domestic ￿rm. This ￿rm has three
choices when it comes to industrial structure: It can merge domestically or internationally,
or it can build up green￿eld production capacity abroad.5 Here green￿eld FDI is modelled
as an all-or-nothing choice, meaning that either the ￿rm in question wholly produces
domestically ￿or all its production is moved out of the country. An international merger
can be bad from the viewpoint of unionised workers, as their wages are kept down, but
full capital ￿ ight is even worse, since all jobs in the ￿rm is then lost. We assume that
policy makers can ban mergers, but not force ￿rms to merge. A national champion policy
that bans cross-border mergers could then just as well lead to the domestic ￿rm investing
green￿eld abroad and thus ￿ eeing the domestic economy ￿and not to a domestic merger.
From the domestic society￿ s viewpoint this kind of green￿eld FDI turns out to be the worst
of the options available. In sum, the paper cautions that a national champion policy can
4Economist and previous US ￿nance minister Lawrence Summers aired such scepticism against sov-
ereign wealth funds at the 2008 World Economic Forum meeting in Davos. The Norwegian ￿nance minister,
Kristin Halvorsen, replied, in quite undiplomatic language, that the US "is in deep shit" and relies on the
capital in￿ ow (NTB, 21.01.2008).
5It is quite rare in the literature that all these three options are considered within a uni￿ed framework.
3seriously back￿re ￿even in a model setting that on the surface is constructed to make
merger patriotism sensible. This does in no way imply that unionised workers cannot
be hurt by globalisation or that cross-border mergers cannot be detrimental for domestic
welfare, it only means that a restrictive policy towards cross-border mergers is simply not
the right policy prescription.
There exists a quite large theoretical economics literature on international mergers, and
a substantially smaller body of work on the national champion issue.6;7 The current paper
utilises elements that can also be found in Lommerud, Straume and Słrgard (2006). Also
in that paper cross-border mergers lead to a situation where a multinational ￿rm can play
unionised workers in di⁄erent countries out against each other. This in turn may imply
that cross-border mergers take place that are not welfare-improving. Rather, the point of
the merger is to tilt the distribution of resources between groups in society, not to maximise
surplus in society in some sense. However, that model is set up in such a way that ￿rst best
merger policy often turns out to be to ban all mergers, rather than to pursue a national
champion policy. In the current model, we have tilted the analysis even further in favour
of national champions, for example by assuming that only domestic mergers entail variable
cost synergies. The essential di⁄erence between the two papers, though, is that we here
allow the possibility of internationalisation of the ￿rm through foreign direct investment.
Norb￿ck and Persson (2007) is an interesting paper that concerns itself with investment
liberalization and cross-border mergers, but not the national champion question itself. The
authors warn that a restrictive policy towards foreign takeovers can have unwanted e⁄ects,
but their line of argument is distinctly di⁄erent from ours. They consider inward green￿eld
FDI as the alternative to a cross-border merger, but here a domestic national champion
merger is ignored as an alternative.8 Norb￿ck and Persson emphasise that a developing
country can harm itself by pursuing a restrictive cross-border merger policy. Combining
6Open economy merger policy issues in a wider context are studied, for example, by Barros and Cabral
(1994), Head and Ries (1997), Horn and Persson (2001a), Bjorvatn (2004), and Neary (2007).
7It is also relevant to mention the large literature on how di⁄erent groups of workers, perhaps organsed
in trade unions, fare in the face of globalisation. See for example Naylor (1998), Neary (2002), Lommerud,
Meland and Słrgard (2003), Straume (2003), Saint-Paul (2007), W￿lde and Weiss (2007) and Egger and
Kreickemeier (2008).
8This also applies for Nocke and Yeaple (2007).
4the strong ￿rm-speci￿c assets of a multinational with the strong country-speci￿c assets
of a domestic ￿rm has the potential to create a large surplus. The important point is
to create competition for the acquisition of the domestic asset, so that the successful
multinational bidder does not pay a too low price. The multinational is not only willing
to pay according to what the assets at play are worth for itself, it also has a value to
prevent its competitors from obtaining the domestic ￿rm. There are also several recent
papers that discuss the national champion question more directly, but here green￿eld FDI
is typically not an option. We have learnt from the strategic trade literature that, in
an international Cournot oligopoly, policy that increases the market share of domestic
producers will be bene￿cial for the domestic country ￿if a policy evaluator only cares
about the welfare of domestic agents. In such a framework it is interesting to investigate
if a national champion type of merger policy can increase the welfare of domestic agents
and the consequences for agents residing abroad. It is also interesting to investigate how
merger policy interacts with tax policy in such a setting. Research that broadly pursues
this type of questions include Hau￿ er and Nielsen (2008), Hau￿ er and Schulte (2007),
S￿dekum (2006, 2007) and Lommerud, Olsen and Straume (2008).9 Note that this type
of analysis is quite di⁄erent from the present model: we focus on how national champion
policy can tilt the power balance between domestic stakeholders, which this literature pays
little attention to.
There is also a substantial empirical literature on the foreign ownership wage premium.
On the surface, in many countries workers tend to earn more in foreign-owned ￿rms, seem-
ingly at odds with the theoretical model developed here. Almeida (2007) uses a matched
employer-employee data set from Portugal, and ￿nds that the seemingly high wages in
foreign owned ￿rms has more to do with ￿ cherry picking￿in the selection of takeover tar-
gets than human capital development and wage increases in ￿rms having been bought.
Heyman, Sj￿holm and Tingvall (2007) also use such matched data, this time from Swe-
den. They ￿nd comparatively small wage premia associated with various forms of foreign
ownership, and in the case of takeovers of Swedish ￿rms the e⁄ect on wages is zero or neg-
9Huck and Konrad (2004) also deal with merger policy in a strategic trade context.
5ative. Girma and G￿rg (2007) report, from a British data set, substantial heterogeneity in
the post-acquisition wage e⁄ect depending on the nationality of the acquirer and the skill
group of workers. Almost no policy maker would take the stance that all international
mergers are harmful. Sometimes a foreign takeover means that the local subsidiary can be
developed in a better way and that the human capital of the employees is strengthened.
Our model focuses on a case where workers secure high wages because their ￿rms have
market power, and where international mergers may threaten their position. All conclu-
sions are of course then relative to this framework, and we wish to make no bold statement
about the aggregate foreign-ownership wage e⁄ect in society.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model framework. Then Section
3 analyses how ￿rms arrive at a choice between merging domestically or internationally,
whereas Section 4 evaluates the situation from a policy maker￿ s viewpoint. Section 5 then
introduces the possibility of capital ￿ ight, in the sense that a ￿rm physically moves its
production abroad. This added option turns out to be crucial for the analysis. Section 6
o⁄ers some concluding remarks.
2 The model
Consider an industry where, initially, three ￿rms (single-plant owners) each produce a
single (di⁄erentiated) good for a common international market. Two of the ￿rms (1 and
2) are located in the ￿ domestic￿country, whilst the third ￿rm is located elsewhere. We
have in mind an international market where domestic consumption is negligible relative
to global consumption. Thus, for simplicity, we abstract from domestic consumption
altogether by applying a pure third-market model. The inverse demand facing Firm i is
given by




where a is a positive constant, b 2 (0;1) is an inverse measure of the degree of product
di⁄erentiation, and qi is supplied quantity of variety i.
6The ￿rms have similar technologies, characterised by a Leontief production function of
the form qi = minfli;kig, where li and ki are, respectively, the labour and capital employed
by Firm i. Labour costs are wi and capital costs are c(1￿￿i) per unit. Firm i￿ s marginal
costs are thus given by
mi = wi + c(1 ￿ ￿i); (2)
where ￿i is a binary variable re￿ ecting exogenous domestic merger synergies. We assume
that a domestic merger yields an exogenous marginal cost saving equal to ￿c, where





￿ if Firm i participates in a domestic merger
0 otherwise
: (3)
We assume that domestic ￿rms face an industry-wide monopoly trade union, while the
foreign ￿rm, operating in a non-unionised environment, has access to labour at a wage
rate w < a ￿ c. We want to portray a situation where domestic (unionised) ￿rms have a
cost disadvantage, and this is most easily done by setting the domestic reservation wage
equal to w.
The domestic union is a rent-maximiser. With the added assumption that the union




(wi ￿ w)qi; (4)
where N is the set of domestic plants. We apply the traditional monopoly union frame-
work, where wages are unilaterally set by the monopoly trade union prior to the ￿rms￿
employment decisions. The ￿rms are assumed to compete in quantities Æ la Cournot, with
pro￿ts from plant i given by
￿i = (pi ￿ mi)qi: (5)
10We want to depict a situation where a domestic merger yields higher exogenous costs savings than
does a cross-border merger. This is most easily represented by assuming that only a domestic merger
yields exogenous cost savings.
73 Domestic versus cross-border merger
We assume that, in addition to the benchmark oligopoly market structure, there are two
feasible merger options in the industry: a domestic merger or a cross-border merger. For
simplicity, assume that both options involve Firm 1.11 In other words, we let Firm 1
choose between merging domestically with Firm 2 or merging cross-border with Firm
3.12;13 In order to solve for the equilibrium market structure, we apply the endogenous
merger formation model of Horn and Persson (2001b), where the merger process is treated
as a cooperative game where the merger candidates are free to communicate and write
binding contracts. Using the core as solution concept, an equilibrium market structure is
a market structure that is undominated, in terms of joint pro￿ts of the decisive owners, by
any other possible market structure. Allowing for side payments within, but not between,
coalitions, the decisive owners are the group of owners that are able to in￿ uence whether
market structure Mi will be formed instead of Mj, and vice versa. More precisely, the
group of decisive owners, when comparing Mi and Mj, are the owners that belong to
di⁄erent coalitions in Mi and Mj.14 In our speci￿c case, there are three market structures
to consider: oligopoly (MO), domestic merger (MD) and cross-border merger (MC).
3.1 Merger e⁄ects on domestic wages and employment
Before solving for the equilibrium market structure, let us ￿rst see how di⁄erent types of
mergers a⁄ect domestic wages and employment. The Nash equilibrium outcomes, in terms
of production (employment), wages and pro￿ts, are reported, for each market structure, in
the Appendix. Letting wk
i denote the equilibrium wage level at plant i in market structure
11Even though we shortly will introduce elements from endogenous merger theory, ￿xing attention on
the possibilities of one particular ￿rm is reminiscent of the traditional exogenous merger theory in the path
of Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) and Deneckere and Davidson (1985).
12In line with previous related literature, we exclude the possibility of full monopolisation of the industry.
A market structure involving a merger among all ￿rms is both less interesting and, in any case, unlikely
to be sanctioned by antitrust authorities.
13We assume that, post-merger, it is not possible to move the production of one brand from one plant
to another. Thus, the quintessence of a merger is a coordination of output decisions among the merger
participants.
14See Horn and Persson (2001b) for details of the theoretical underpinnings, including a formal de￿nition
of decisive owners.





1 , i = 1;2:
Compared with the benchmark oligopoly equilibrium, only a domestic merger will lead
to a wage increase (for ￿ > 0). A cross-border merger, on the other hand, will lead to
reduced wages, but only at the domestic plant of the merged ￿rm. Although the model
set-up is somewhat di⁄erent, the intuition for these results is for the most part similar
to what is explained in great detail in Lommerud, Straume and Słrgard (2006). Here,
we will just summarise the main mechanisms. A cross-border merger allows, to a certain
extent, the merged unit to replace domestic (high-cost) production with foreign (low-cost)
production.15 This increases the labour demand elasticity at the domestic plant and forces
the domestic union to lower the wage in order to mitigate job losses. The strength of this
e⁄ect depends on the degree of product di⁄erentiation. The less di⁄erentiated products
are, the easier (less costly) it is for the merged unit to replace domestic with foreign
production. Thus, a cross-border merger works as a wage disciplining device towards the
domestic trade union, and more so the less di⁄erentiated the products of the merging
parties. A domestic merger, on the other hand, does not have this e⁄ect on union wage
demand, since the trade union controls labour supply at both plants. In fact, in the
absence of any exogenous merger synergies, a domestic merger has no e⁄ect on union
wage demand.16 However, when there are other variable cost synergies of a merger, there
will be a positive labour demand response causing wages to increase. Thus, for ￿ > 0, a
domestic merger leads to higher wages.
The corresponding domestic employment e⁄ects of merger depend, in part, on the size
of the domestic merger synergies. Let Lk :=
P
i2N lk
i denote total employment at domestic
plants in market structure Mk. Furthermore, let S := ￿c
a￿w￿c be a measure of exogenous
domestic merger synergies. Three di⁄erent scenarios can be identi￿ed:
15Note that this does not imply that production capacity is moved from one country to another, which
is blocked by assumption. Rather, it is to some extent possible to meet market demand by scaling up
production at the low-cost location and scaling down where costs are higher. Remeber that the products
at di⁄erent locations are only imperfect substitutes, which o⁄ers some degree of shelter from competition
to the high-cost provider.
16This is a quite general result; see Dhillon and Petrakis (2002).
9Proposition 2 (i) If S ￿ b
4, then LO > LC ￿ LD;






, then LO ￿ LD > LC;
(iii) If S > b
2(1+b), then LD > LO > LC:
Compared with the benchmark oligopoly equilibrium, a cross-border merger always
reduces domestic employment. Thus, the wage drop at the domestic plant is not su¢ cient
to fully compensate for the drop in domestic labour demand. The employment e⁄ect of a
domestic merger, on the other hand, depends crucially on the amount of cost synergies. If
these are small, a domestic merger will reduce employment even more than a cross-border
merger. On the other hand, for su¢ ciently large cost synergies, the market structure with
a domestic merger yields the highest level of domestic employment.
3.2 Equilibrium market structure
In our speci￿c model, for a market structure involving a merger to be undominated, and
thus constitute an equilibrium market structure, two conditions must be jointly ful￿lled:
(i) the merger must be privately pro￿table for the merger participants, and (ii) the merger
must generate higher total industry pro￿ts than in any of the alternative market structures.
The second condition follow from the fact that, when comparing the two market structures
involving a merger, MC and MD, all three owners are decisive. Assuming that antitrust
authorities will allow any of the two considered merger proposals, the following result
obtains:
Proposition 3 Under a laissez-faire merger policy, there is always a merger in equilib-
rium. The equilibrium market structure is MC (MD) if S < (>)S1, where
S1 :=
3b + 3b2 ￿ b3 ￿ 2 +
p
8 + (2 ￿ b)b(3b2 (3 + b ￿ b2) ￿ 2)
2(b + b2 + 1)
: (6)
A formal proof simply contains straightforward pro￿t comparisons between di⁄erent
market structures and is thus omitted. It is more instructive to go through the di⁄erent
steps of the proof intuitively. Due to the wage-reducing e⁄ect of a cross-border merger,
10such a merger is always privately pro￿table and, naturally, also increases total industry
pro￿ts. Thus, we can rule out the benchmark oligopoly as an equilibrium outcome of
the merger process. Whether Firm 1 will merge cross-border or domestically depends on
which type of merger that generates higher industry pro￿ts. This depends, in turn, on
the magnitude of cost savings. Since a cross-border merger induces a wage cut, while a
domestic merger leads to a wage increase, the latter type of merger yields higher industry
pro￿ts only if the exogenous merger synergies are su¢ ciently large; more precisely, if
S > S1. A merger synergy of this magnitude also ensures that the domestic merger is
privately pro￿table. A closer scrutiny of the threshold value, S1, reveals that it is positive
and increasing in b. Thus, the scope for a domestic merger is lower in industries with a
low degree of product di⁄erentiation. The reason is that the wage disciplining e⁄ect of
a cross-border merger is higher the lower the degree of product di⁄erentiation, implying
that the attractiveness of such a merger is increasing in b.
4 Domestic merger policy
Let us now introduce a domestic policy towards mergers. We assume that the domestic
policy maker is concerned about allocating industry rents to the domestic country. Since
corporate shareholding is usually highly diversi￿ed and global, and pro￿ts are di¢ cult to
tax, it is reasonable to assume that the policy maker places a considerably larger weight
on the rents accruing to domestic workers.17 We take this argument to the extreme by
assuming that the objective of the domestic policy maker is simply to maximise domestic
union rents, i.e., domestic welfare in market structure Mk is given by Wk := Uk.
By comparing the di⁄erent market structures we can identify two alternative welfare
rankings, depending on whether domestic merger synergies are below or above a certain
17This can be debated, but remember that we primarily want to show that national champion merger
policy can be problematic even in an environment that on the surface seems very favourable for such a




(2 ￿ b)(1 + b)(2 + 2b ￿ b2) ￿ 2 ￿ b + b2
2 + 2b
: (7)









￿ 0:11. We can then make the following domestic welfare rankings:
Proposition 4 (i) If S ￿ S2, then WO ￿ WN > WC;
(ii) If S > S2, then WN > WO > WC:
A cross-border merger is always the least preferred market structure, from the view-
point of the domestic policy maker, due to the merger-induced downward pressure on
domestic wages. A domestic merger, on the other hand, enables the domestic wage level
to increase, while the employment e⁄ect is ambiguous. This is the most preferred market
structure if the exogenous cost synergies are su¢ ciently high. The implications for optimal
merger policy is straightforward:
Corollary 1 A cross-border merger proposal will never be accepted. A domestic merger
proposal will be accepted if the merger synergies are su¢ ciently high: S > S2.
If domestic merger synergies are low (S < S2), all merger proposals will be declined.
Otherwise, for S > S2, the domestic policy maker will decline a cross-border merger
proposal but accept a domestic merger proposal. In the following, we will refer to this as
a national champion policy.
How is the domestic merger policy going to a⁄ect the equilibrium market structure?
Ruling out the possibility of cross-border merger, we are left with only two possible mar-
ket structures: MO or MD. The equilibrium is then simply determined by the private
pro￿tability of a domestic merger. The relevant pro￿t comparison shows that a domestic
merger is pro￿table if




2 + 2b ￿ b2￿




12It is straightforward to verify that S3 < S2 < S1 for all b 2 (0;1). This enables us to
characterise the optimal domestic merger policy and its e⁄ects as follows:
Proposition 5 (i) If S ￿ S2, the optimal policy is to decline all merger proposals. The
outcome is oligopoly instead of a cross-border merger.
(ii) If S2 < S ￿ S1, the optimal policy is a national champion policy. The outcome is
a domestic merger instead of a cross-border merger.
(iii) If S > S1, merger policy is redundant. The outcome is a domestic merger in any
case.
In terms of deriving a rationale for a national champion policy, Regime (ii) is clearly
the interesting case. It shows that, for intermediate levels of domestic merger synergies,
a national champion policy is both optimal and e⁄ective: by blocking any cross-border
merger proposals, a domestic policy maker can induce a domestic merger, thereby increas-
ing domestic welfare.
5 Capital ￿ ight
Assume now that, in addition to the two merger alternatives, Firm 1 has a third feasible
option: capital ￿ ight. Consider the case where Firm 1 can set up a plant in a foreign
non-unionised location at a ￿xed investment cost f. We assume that such a relocation of
production will give the investing ￿rm access to labour at a wage rate w. The relocated
￿rm continues to produce the same variant of the product in question as before, so the
degree of product di⁄erentiation among the products of the three plants remain the same.
The relocation option creates a fourth possible market structure, denoted MF, with an
oligopoly consisting of one high-cost (unionised) and two low-cost (non-unionised) ￿rms.18
Let us ￿rst see how capital ￿ ight a⁄ects domestic wages and employment, compared
with the previously discussed market structures. Again, using the equilibrium expressions
18In order to keep the analysis reasonably simple and focussed, we rule out the possibility of combining
two of the options; i.e., we rule out the possibility of merging and relocating production.
13reported in the Appendix, the e⁄ect of capital ￿ ight by one of the domestic ￿rms can be
characterised as follows:
Proposition 6 (i) Compared with the benchmark oligopoly outcome, capital ￿ight by one







. (ii) Compared with all other market structures, capital ￿ight always
reduces domestic employment.
If we compare with the benchmark oligopoly, capital ￿ ight by one domestic ￿rm implies
that the remaining domestic ￿rm faces tougher competition, since it becomes the only high-
cost ￿rm in the industry. This, in turn, induces the union to lower its wage demand in order
to stimulate domestic employment. However, in terms of total domestic employment, the
direct job losses brought about by capital ￿ ight can, unsurprisingly, never be compensated
for by the remaining domestic ￿rm.
5.1 Laissez-faire equilibria
How is the option of capital ￿ ight for Firm 1 going to a⁄ect the equilibrium market
structure? The capital ￿ ight option can be incorporated straightforwardly into the Horn-
Persson framework. Each of the previously considered market structures must now be
compared with the capital ￿ ight option. For example, MD will dominate MF if it is
possible for Firm 2 and Firm 1 to agree on a domestic merger deal that makes both ￿rms





2 , and vice versa. For capital ￿ ight to occur in equilibrium, this
option must obviously also be privately pro￿table for Firm 1, i.e., ￿F
1 > ￿O
1 .
In order to derive the equilibrium outcome, we need to make use of the following partial
results:
145.1.1 The pro￿tability of capital ￿ ight
The private pro￿tability of capital ￿ ight obviously depends on the magnitude of relocation
costs. A simple pro￿t comparison reveals that ￿F
1 > ￿O
1 if
f < f1 :=
(2b + 3)(a ￿ w ￿ c)
2
4(b + 1)(b + 2)
2 : (9)
Since @f1=@b < 0 on the interval (0;1), it follows that capital ￿ ight is less likely to be
a pro￿table option the less di⁄erentiated products are. This is quite intuitive, since less
di⁄erentiation (i.e., more competition) reduces domestic wages and thereby reduces the
gain of capital ￿ ight.
5.1.2 Capital ￿ ight versus domestic merger
In qualitative terms, a domestic merger yields higher pro￿ts for the domestic ￿rms if the
ratio between merger synergies and relocation costs is su¢ ciently high. Since the threshold
level of merger synergies is monotonically decreasing in f, we can consider the following
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2 + 2b ￿ b2￿q
(14b + 5b2 + 10)(b + 1)
3







4 for all b 2 (0;1), and we can thus establish three di⁄erent regions of
merger synergies:
(i) If S < SL




2 for all f 2 (0;f1);










2 if f > (<) b f, where b f 2 (0;f1);
(iii) If S > SH




2 for all f 2 (0;f1).
Notice also that both SL
4 and SH
4 are decreasing in b on (0;1), re￿ ecting the generally
15lower attractiveness of capital ￿ ight in industries with more intense competition.
5.1.3 Capital ￿ ight versus cross-border merger
Compared with capital ￿ ight by Firm 1, a cross-border merger yields higher joint pro￿ts






f > f2 :=
￿
48 + 128b ￿ 4b2 ￿ 212b3 ￿ 86b4 + 84b5 + 37b6 ￿ 10b7 ￿ 3b8￿
(a ￿ w ￿ c)
2
16(b + 2)
2 (b + 1)
2 (2 + 2b ￿ b2)
2 :
(12)
It is straightforward to verify that @f2=@b < 0 on (0;1). Furthermore, f2 < 0 if b > 0:94.
This means that, even if capital ￿ ight is costless, a cross-border merger still yields higher
joint pro￿ts if products are close to homogeneous (b > 0:94). Not only is the gain of
capital ￿ ight lower in industries with little product di⁄erentiation, but the e⁄ectiveness of
cross-border merger, in terms of reducing domestic wages, is that much higher.
We are now ready to characterise the market structure equilibria, assuming again
that any of the two considered merger proposals will always be sanctioned by antitrust
authorities.
Proposition 7 Under a laissez-faire merger policy, the following equilibria can be iden-
ti￿ed:





, the unique equilibrium market structure is MD for all b 2
(0;1) and f ￿ 0.






for b < 0:94 and S > SH
4 for b > 0:94,
the unique equilibrium market structure is MF for all b 2 (0;1).
(iii) If S < S1 and f > f2, the unique equilibrium market structure is MC for all
b 2 (0;1).





> S3, the proof follows from the above
analysis.
16(ii) Since f2 < f1 for all b 2 (0;1), f < f2 is always the relevant restriction. The












1 (f2) + ￿F
2 , explicitly given by
S :=
p
112b + 156b2 + 56b3 ￿ 62b4 ￿ 34b5 + 7b6 + 3b7 + 32





(iii) Since a cross-border merger is always privately pro￿table (compared with the
benchmark oligopoly), the two stated conditions are necessary and su¢ cient.
5.2 The scope for a national champion policy
The interesting question in this context is how the possibility of capital ￿ ight a⁄ects the
optimal domestic merger policy; in particular, if and how it a⁄ects the scope for a national
champion policy. Notice ￿rst that, in terms of domestic welfare, capital ￿ ight is always
the worst outcome, since it leads to severe job losses and lower wages for the remaining
domestic workers. However, it would be highly unreasonable to assume that the domestic
policy maker is able directly to prevent Firm 1 from ￿ eeing the country and relocating
production elsewhere. Thus, if f < f1, domestic merger policy cannot be used to prevent
industrial restructuring, it can only be used to in￿ uence the type of industrial restructuring
that takes place. Let us ￿rst de￿ne the cases where merger policy plays no role:
Proposition 8 If the laissez-faire equilibrium market structure is either MD or MF,
domestic merger policy is always either redundant (in the former case) or ine⁄ective (in
the latter case).






S2 for all b 2 (0;1). The latter result is obvious.
Thus, the most interesting case is when the laissez-faire equilibrium market structure
involves a cross-border merger, MC. Let us make the additional assumption that capital
￿ ight is always privately pro￿table, i.e., f < f1. In this case, it can never be an optimal
policy to block a domestic merger, since this alternative is always better, in terms of
17domestic welfare, than the relevant alternatives: cross-border merger or capital ￿ ight.
Thus, the only active merger policy that is potentially optimal is a national champion
policy where the policy maker blocks any cross-border merger proposals in order to induce
the domestic ￿rms to merge instead. The following proposition characterises the scope for
a national champion policy in this particular case:
Proposition 9 Assume that the laissez-faire equilibrium market structure is MC and that
capital ￿ight is privately pro￿table, i.e., S < S1 and f 2 (f2;f1). The scope for a national
champion policy is then the following:




, a national champion policy is e⁄ective and optimal for all f 2
(f2;f1). This set is non-empty only if b > 0:20137.
(ii) If S < SL
4 , a national champion policy is both ine⁄ective and counterproductive
for all f 2 (f2;f1). A laissez-faire merger policy is welfare superior.







, a national champion policy is e⁄ective and optimal if f
is su¢ ciently high, and ine⁄ective and counterproductive otherwise. In the latter case, a
laissez-faire merger policy is welfare superior.
Proof. When the domestic policy maker adopts a national champion policy, and given
that f < f1, the equilibrium market structure is determined by the dominance ranking
(in terms of joint domestic pro￿ts) of MD and MF. Thus, the proof of part (i) follows
from the proof of part (ii) of Proposition 7, while the proof of part (ii) follows directly
from the derivation of (13). By construction, part (iii) follows then automatically. It is







is non-empty for all b 2 (0;1).
The stated implications for optimal merger policy follows from the fact that capital ￿ ight
is always the least desirable outcome, from a domestic welfare perspective.
A national champion policy is certain to work only if domestic merger synergies are
su¢ ciently large and, in addition, products are not too di⁄erentiated. Otherwise, it might
be both ine⁄ective and counterproductive. Ine⁄ective, because blocking a cross-border
merger will not induce a domestic merger, and counterproductive, because it will induce
an outcome that is even worse for the policy maker, namely capital ￿ ight. If domestic


























Figure 1: The scope for a national champion policy
merger synergies are su¢ ciently low, S < SL
4 , this will always be the case.
Notice that, since S (S1) is monotonically decreasing (increasing) in b, the scope for
a national champion policy is inversely related to the degree of product di⁄erentiation
in the industry. A national champion policy is relevant only if the laissez-faire equilib-
rium market structure is MC, and such a policy is optimal only if it induces a domestic
merger (the ￿ good￿outcome) rather than capital ￿ ight (the ￿ bad￿outcome). As previously
discussed, the gains of a cross-border merger are higher in industries with less di⁄erenti-
ated products, implying that MC is an equilibrium outcome for a larger set of parameter
con￿gurations, increasing the relevance of a national champion policy. At the same time,
we know that less di⁄erentiated products (implying stronger competition) reduces, all else
equal, the incentive for capital ￿ ight. This increases the likelihood that the most attractive
alternative to a cross-border merger is a domestic one, rather than capital ￿ ight by Firm
1. Thus, the scope for a national champion policy is larger in industries with less product
di⁄erentiation, and vice versa.
An illustration of the three di⁄erent regimes from Proposition 9 (with a corresponding
labelling of regimes) is given in Figure 1. Domestic merger synergies are measured on the
19vertical axis, while product di⁄erentiation is inversely measured on the horizontal axis.
Only in area (i) is a national champion policy always e⁄ective and optimal. In area (ii), a
national champion policy is not only ine⁄ective, but also counterproductive: By blocking
a cross-border, the result will be capital ￿ ight, which is an even worse outcome in terms
of domestic welfare. In area (iii), a national champion policy is e⁄ective and optimal if
relocation costs are su¢ ciently high, and ine⁄ective and counterproductive otherwise. We
see that the scope for a national champion policy is clearly increasing in the parameter b.
5.3 Globalisation
Finally, since the analysis is cast in the setting of global market competition, we would
like to indulge in some speculation about how our results would be a⁄ected by globalisa-
tion. We can use our model to discuss two particular interpretations (with corresponding
measures) of globalisation which, as we argue below, have opposite e⁄ects with respect to
the scope for a national champion policy.
One interpretation of globalization is that it leads to ￿ercer product market competi-
tion. As in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) we can think of the di⁄erentiation parameter b
as a measure of the degree of competition between ￿rms.19 We have already analysed and
discussed the e⁄ect of the parameter b; from the above analysis, and with this particular
interpretation, it follows that globalisation increases the scope for a national champion
policy.
However, another standard interpretation of globalisation is market integration, typi-
cally modelled as market expansion.20 In our parameterised model, this corresponds most
closely to an increase in the demand parameter a. How does this a⁄ect our results? This is
most easily seen with respect to Figure 1. Remember that our measure of domestic merger
19Within a framwork of monopolistic competition, Blanchard and Giavazzi make this interpretation on
the parameter measuring the elasticity of substitution in a CES demand function, but there is of course
a clear analogy to the di⁄erentiation parameter in a linear demand system. It is important to stress,
though, that by interpreting a parameter change in a demand system as a result of globalisation (or other
institutional changes), one should think of the parameter, in our case b, not as a taste parameter in a utility
function but rather interpret the underlying utility function as a reduced form re￿ ecting the substitutability
among products.
20See also Lommerud, Meland and Straume (2005).
20synergies are de￿ned as S := ￿c
a￿w￿c. An increase in a therefore implies a reduction in S,
increasing the likelihood that the relevant region is (ii), rather than (i). Thus, with this
particular interpretation, globalisation reduces the scope for a national champion policy.
The reason is simply that, since the cost of capital ￿ ight is ￿xed, a demand increase makes
this option more attractive relative to a domestic merger. This consequently increases the
likelihood that a national champion policy will be ine⁄ective and counterproductive.
6 Concluding Remarks
The ongoing process of investment liberalisation has made international mergers much
more commonplace than they were just some few years ago. The purpose of this paper has
been to discuss if national champion type merger policies can be made sense of in a rather
standard model of international unionised oligopoly. We have chosen assumptions that
consistently seem to favour a national champion argument: International mergers depress
unionised wages, domestic mergers entail larger non-wage variable cost synergies than do
international ones, policy makers care more for domestic workers than for domestically
residing capital owners. This approach, of course, only makes sense if one wants to argue
that even in such a benign environment national champion policies can seriously back￿re.
We ￿rst investigate a model where a given domestic ￿rm only has three options: to
merge cross-border, to merge domestically, or not to engage in a merger. Then a national
champion policy can make sense, in particular when the cost synergies associated with
domestic merger are large enough. (But if these cost savings are very large, national
champion policy becomes redundant, since the outcome would be domestic merger even
in the absence of policy.)
However, the chief innovation of the paper is to introduce a fourth alternative for the
given domestic ￿rm, namely to move all production to a non-unionised location ￿but then
also carrying a presumably large ￿xed cost of relocation.21 This drastically reduces the
21Much research has studied either the choice between domestic or cross-border merger, or the choice
between cross-border merger and green￿eld FDI, but it seems obvious that all these options should ideally
be studied simultaneously. The current paper is a ￿rst step in this direction.
21scope for a ban on international mergers. For many parameter constellations a national
champion policy will be what we dub ￿ ine⁄ective and counterproductive￿ . This means
that blocking an international merger will not produce the desired alternative, namely a
domestic merger. Instead this will provoke an outcome that is even worse for the policy
maker, namely capital ￿ ight.
However the scope for economic patriotism in merger policy is only reduced, not elim-
inated by the introduction of the capital ￿ ight option. Three key parameters in the model
are the size of the domestic merger synergies, the degree of product di⁄erentiation among
the products of the oligopolists and the ￿xed relocation cost. The paper pursues this in
detail, but generally speaking, relatively high domestic non-labour cost synergies and a
low degree of product di⁄erentiation can save the national champion argument. The same
applies for a high ￿xed cost of green￿eld investment, which to some extent only amounts
to blocking the relocation option again. We know of no systematic investigation of when
and where economic patriotism seemingly has in￿ uenced merger decisions, but we have an
impression that several well-known examples (as most of those mentioned in the introduc-
tion) concerns infrastructure industries, where relocation of production can be extremely
expensive ￿and where products often are little di⁄erentiated.
The fact that the analysis of this paper seems to warn that national champion policies
may be futile does not mean that international mergers are bene￿cial. Within the model,
international mergers can be harmful because they hurt the position of unionised workers
without realising the non-labour costs savings that a domestic merger would o⁄er (by
assumption). One can easily understand that policy makers would worry about this, but
national champion merger policy is only the correct solution in special circumstances.
It is hard to come up with an alternative, realistic policy option that would put things
right. The model presents a picture of ￿ ordinary workers￿in a› uent countries that owe
their good fortune ￿rst to the fact that the ￿rms they work in have some market power,
and second to the fact that these workers in turn manage to capture some of the pro￿t
created by this market power. In a globalising world where both trade and investments are
22liberalised it will probably be di¢ cult to base a country￿ s prosperity on market power in
some sense. In particular, it will probably become increasingly hard to cage capital in so
that organised labor can secure their share of the spoils. This is exactly what this paper
is about: banning cross-border mergers is an attempt to lock capital to one particular
economy, but this does not work unless one can cage capital in completely by also banning
the physical relocation of investments. Perhaps policy makers should realise this, and that
the essential point to keep a country prosperous in the longer term is to make sure that
the inhabitants of that country are so highly productive that high wages can be sustained
also in the absence of any market power.
23Appendix
Below we report explicit expressions for equilibrium production, wages, pro￿ts and
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